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In December of 1991, the once feared superpower, The Soviet Union (USSR), fell 
leaving its former socialist republics to fend for themselves with their futures unknown. This 
action led to a period known as the Color Revolutions where former Soviet Republics descended 
onto the path of democracy due to intense public protest and the collapse of the former 
communist governments. Some were quite successful like the Orange Revolution of Ukraine and 
the Rose Revolution of Georgia, but many other revolutions in the region left much to be desired, 
with many achieving little to no democracy. This disparity led to the research question; why 
were some post-Soviet states more successful at democratic consolidation while others are still 
struggling? This has been a research topic since the dissolution of the USSR and even more so 
after the mixed successes of the color revolutions that swept through the region in the early 21st 
century. The previous research has led to two theories that can explain a great portion as to why 
there is such differing levels. Elite theory and democratic consolidation theory provide insight 
concerning the power that domestic political actors have during the transition and consolidation 
process.  Therefore, the analytic framework can explain the actions and behaviors of domestic 
actors, particularly elites, and their role in a democratizing state. Yet, it does not account for 
foreign military intervention and aggression and how that affects democratization within a state. 
This will be seen in the case studies of the Republic of Georgia and Ukraine.  
Literature Review 
Concerning the literature on Democratic Consolidation within the Post-Soviet States, 
there seems to be an agreement amongst scholars concerning the role of state actors and a state’s 
journey towards becoming a liberal democracy. There is a general consensus amongst scholars 
that state actors were key in either the advancement or decline of democratic consolidation. Yet, 
this is where the agreement ends and a schism between the scholars starts to form. The first camp 
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of scholars argues that external state actors are the reason why some states have advanced 
towards democracy and others reverted. The second camp argues that its domestic political 
actors that have influenced the process of democratic consolidation. Therefore, the current state 
of the literature remains to leave little to no consensus due to the disagreement between scholars 
concerning the power and influence of geo-political and domestic actors.  
Geopolitical Actors  
  As previously mentioned, the first camp of scholars argue that geopolitical actors are the 
reason as to why some states have experienced a significant amount of democratic consolidation 
while others seem to have become stagnant or have weakened considerably. According to 
scholars O’Dowd and Dimitrova, a geo-political actor is an external state with considerable 
influence over a certain geographical region (O’Dowd and Dimitrova 2011). In the case of the 
Post-Soviet space, this includes the European Union and the Russian Federation. The schism 
further widens as scholars’ debate on which geo-political actor retains greater influence over 
post-Soviet states. Scholars like Pidham and Dimitrova argue that the most influential geo-
political actor in the Post-Soviet space is the European Union due to its economic status and the 
opportunities that come with it. Others like Jackson, Ziegler, and Petersheim argue that the 
Russian Federation remains to be the most-influential geo-political actor due to its cultural, 
linguistic, and historical hegemony as well as new approaches like the use of frozen conflicts to 
prevent further democratic consolidation. Therefore, the literature does not provide an answer to 
which geo-political influence is stronger but rather continues to leave no consensus.  
European Union   
The first group of scholars, led by scholars Pidham and Dimitrova, have chosen the 
European Union as the main geopolitical actor in the region due to its trillion-dollar market and 
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the current want and need for access by Post-Soviet states. In order to gain access into this 
market, regulations were created by the European Union that applying states must adhere to in 
order to be granted membership. The Copenhagen European Council Consensus of 1993 outlines 
that a state must have sufficient democratic consolidation along with other factors to be inducted 
as a member of the European Union (Copenhagen Criteria 1993). In order for negotiations to 
even begin, democratic consolidation must have been met (Copenhagen Criteria 1993).  
Pidham, a scholar studying the transitional process from communism to democracy, 
argues that the EU uses the leverage of sufficient democratization as a method to keep other 
newly democratic states in control with conditional acceptance into the European Union (Pidham 
2004). These rules were deemed to be semi- successful as previous studies have shown that post-
Soviet states whom were granted membership into the European Union have higher ratings of 
democratic consolidation compared to other states who have either not been granted nor applied 
for membership. EU Membership is not the only method the European Union uses to influence 
democratic consolidation over post-Soviet states. The European Union has dispersed millions of 
dollars into democratic consolidation projects into the Central Asian states as well as current 
applicants into the European Union (Jackson 2014).   
Within this specific argument, discrepancies begin to arise. Some scholars like 
Petersheim, find the Copenhagen European Council Consensus to be too broad due to an absence 
of a clear definition for what sufficient democratic consolidation is (Petersheim 2012). The lack 
of an exact definition creates an issue of how well democracy is actually being consolidated 
within post-soviet spaces. For example, over the past few years, scholars have noticed a 
significant backslide in democratic consolidation in former soviet-spaces. This specific backslide 
creates skepticism amongst scholars whether the rules and regulations outlined in the 
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Copenhagen European Council Consensus of 1993 were actually useful in the promotion of 
democracy in former Soviet spaces (Cianetti, Dawson, Hanley 2018). Also, scholars like 
Sharshenova have noticed that the European Union’s financial aid programs to former Soviet 
republics in Central Asia have fallen short; for example, there are a diverse number of financial 
aid programs but the democracy driven programs are often avoided when it comes to sensitive 
matters (Sharshenova 2017).  
While some scholars still argue that the European Union maintains a significant amount 
of influence within the region, others scholars refute this argument by stating that the European 
Union was never actually successful in the actual promotion of democracy throughout the post-
Soviet space. This counter-argument not only affects the argument that the European Union is a 
strong geo-political actor within the post-Soviet space but their influence on the varying levels of 
democratic consolidation within the post-Soviet bloc. Considering the European Union’s 
economic capabilities and historical geo-political influence, it is almost positive that they would 
have some sort of significant influence over the consolidation of democracy within Post-Soviet 
states. Yet, the scholars whom refute the European Union argument, like Petersheim, Jackson, 
and Ziegler contend that The Russian Federation is the real reason why democratic consolidation 
remains to be a question within the region.  
The Russian Federation  
The second camp of scholars, spearheaded by Jackson and Ziegler, argue that the Russian 
Federation maintains significant influence over former states of the Soviet Union. The Russian 
Federation maintains a cultural, linguistic, and historical, political, and economic hegemon in the 
region. This can be seen in all sectors like the entertainment industry, financial aid, the 
promotion of Russian language through Nongovernmental Organizations, and military aid or 
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intervention. Russia’s interest in the near abroad, led by Putin and his allies, inherently has 
affected the process of democratization in the post-soviet space. Some of the most famous frozen 
conflicts are the presence of Russian Peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia 
and in Crimea and the Eastern Region of Ukraine. The Russian Federation also maintains a 
significant presence in Central Asia as well. Jackson, a scholar in Central Asian studies, noticed 
an increase in authoritarianism in central Asian states despite western financial intervention 
(Jackson 2014). She argues that the leaders of these states view Putin’s model of governance as 
more in line with their cultural and indigenous beliefs (Jackson 2014).  
Not only does Putin’s style of governance affect the promotion and consolidation of 
democracy in former Soviet spaces but the economic ties and treaties ultimately have the same 
effect as well. Freedom House released a report in 2016 making the argument that the democratic 
regression of Russia set the precedent for the rise of authoritarianism in former soviet spaces, 
particularly in Central Asia (Ziegler 2016). Scholars also point to the Eurasian Economic Union 
which Moscow uses as a way to maintain authoritarianism in former Soviet spaces in Central 
Asia and keep western liberal democratic values out of the region (Ziegler 2016). Moscow’s 
influence seems to have no constraints within the post-Soviet space yet there is some 
disagreement about Russia’s influence in the post-soviet sphere.  
Jackson and Ziegler argue that the evidence of Moscow’s direct interference into 
democratic consolidation is mixed and quite small. While others like Freire and Heller argue that 
due to the recent events of Russia’s involvement with Syrian and Ukrainian civil conflicts, their 
influence has diminished some of Russia’s soft power in post-Soviet spaces (Freire and Heller 
2017). Despite these small areas of disagreement concerning the strengthening or diminishing of 
Russian geo-political influence, there is a general consensus that Moscow still maintains 
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influence over the post-Soviet region which has inherently interfered in the democratic 
consolidation process. This general consensus brings power to the argument that the Russian 
Federation maintains a significant regional hegemony to influence and effect the process of 
democratic consolidation.  
 Domestic Political Actors  
The second camp of scholars, spearheaded by Kubik and Innes, argue that its domestic 
political actors who influence the process of democratic consolidation, not external geo-political 
actors. A domestic political actor is considered to be local or state actor who has the ability to 
influence policy-making and shaping from within the state (Grimm 2018). Scholars like Kubik, 
Innes, Petrova, and Offe argue that these domestic actors have the resources, the knowledge, and 
the power to either continue or halt change within their respective territories. Despite this 
common agreement disagreement arises about which particular domestic actor really influences 
the process of democratic consolidation.  Scholars like Kubik and Petrova argue that the 
presence of a strong and active civil society can help facilitate and consolidate the process of 
democratic consolidation. Others like Offe, Innes, and Grimm argue that the elite class has 
affected democratic consolidation through the institutionalization of their interests. Overall, the 
continued disagreement between scholars within the literature paints a picture of controlled 
chaos when it comes to answering the question of the disparity in democratic consolidation 
across the Post-Soviet Bloc.  
Civil Society  
The first sub-camp within this group of scholars argue that the reason as to why there is 
such differing levels of democratic consolidation across the post-soviet bloc is due to the level of 
activity and influence of civil society groups. This argument, led by scholars like Kubik and 
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Petrova, argue that the civil society groups in post-Soviet states in central and eastern Europe 
have been successful in giving citizens leverage within their governments and ensuring 
accountability (Kubik and Petrova 2011).  It has even been found that some of these civil society 
groups are already seen as legitimate social actors within their state due to their transnational 
network of influence (Glenn & Mendelson 2002).  
Civil society groups have proven to be successful in areas of deficient democratization 
due to their ability to get outside resources and funding (Petrova 2018). Also, these civil society 
groups bridge the gap and create more transparency and communication between the government 
and their constituents, which inherently creates more trust between either party (Marsh 2000). 
This type of trust is vital, particularly in the post-Soviet era (Marsh 2000). Civil society has an 
effect on the level of democracy within former soviet states. Marsh, Petrova, and Kubik all argue 
that states with high levels of civil society participation see higher levels of consolidated 
democracy because these groups serve as the middle men between the government and the 
citizens which inherently increases trust and overall public participation in the political arena.  
Despite the arguments made by Kubik, Petrova, and Marsh concerning civil society 
groups and their effect on the levels of democratization within these former soviet states, there is 
quite a large push-back from the scholarly community. A large portion of the scholarly 
community like Howard, Rose, Carnaghan, Mishler, and others committed to the domestic actor 
angle refute the claim that appearance and participation of civil society has increased level of 
democratic consolidation for a number of reasons. A number of surveys have been done where 
the general consensus stated that even with higher levels of civic knowledge, a decent amount of 
political interest, and good will, there were still low levels of civic participation across the board 
(Howard 2003). Many scholars like Carnaghan, Howard, Mishler, and Rose attribute this low 
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turnout due to a longstanding distrust in the government and its institutions, even after the 
reforms of the 1990s. (Carnaghan 2001, Mishler & Rose 1997; Rose 2001, Petrova 2011). 
Despite the evidence displayed by Kubik, Petrova, and Marsh, there seems to be a consensus 
within the domestic actor community that more research still needs to be done concerning the 
role of civil society and their influence over the process of democratic consolidation.  
Elites  
However, rather than civil society groups being the dominant domestic actors, there 
seems to be a general consensus that elites are the dominant domestic actor within the Post-
Soviet States. Scholars like Offe, Howard, Carnaghan, and Innes point to a number of reasons as 
to why they see the elite as a dominant actor that has influence to continue or halt democratic 
consolidation during and after times of transition. Much of the literature seems to argue that the 
reforms made during the transition period in the 1990’s were led by elites which made this 
democratic transition “a top down” process; refuting the argument that the reforms made, were 
driven by civil society groups.  Some scholars, like Offe argue that elite participation was 
inevitable due to the historical and political background of post-soviet states (Offe 1991). This 
“top-down” process is important to scholars because it is actually one of the causal effects of 
why there is such unevenness of democratic consolidation across the post-soviet bloc. Many 
scholars like Innes and Dimitrova argue that because of the accelerated process of 
democratization in the post-Soviet bloc affected the types of governance and how power was 
shared within the government. Innes argues that elites have managed to take control of both 
economic and political sectors which inherently affects the consolidation of democracy because 
elite interest becomes institutionalized (Innes 2014). Overall, the domestic elite’s argument 
seems to have a consensus amongst scholars. This consensus creates an opening where elites 
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could be considered the bridge between the two camps of scholars when it comes to explaining 
the disparity of democratic consolidation across the Post-Soviet bloc.  
An Analysis of the Geopolitical Actor vs. Domestic Actor Argument  
The Soviet Union may have dissolved thirty years ago kick-starting democratic 
consolidation across the Post-Soviet bloc, yet scholars have yet to find a consensus on why there 
are such differing levels of democratic consolidation within the post-soviet space. The argument 
of external versus internal actors seems to have created more schisms between scholars due to 
the complexities and sub-groups that come with the Post-Soviet Bloc. From the literature, there 
seems to be a clear distinction that, in the terms of external geo-political actors, the European 
Union maintains influence over parts of Central and Eastern Europe while Russia still maintains 
a regional hegemon over Central Asia and other parts of Eastern Europe. External actors do have 
some influence over newly formed states due to their economic capabilities and foreign-policy 
driven guidance but scholars also point to the fact that state-building comes from within and the 
ability to maintain a democracy is also controlled by the actual state.  
When it comes to the argument of domestic political actors and the issue surrounding 
democratic consolidation, scholars are quick to blame two groups. Civil society has risen as an 
important domestic actor in new democracies around the globe, their participation is often vital 
for the democratic government to continue. Yet, many don’t believe that that is the case for post-
soviet spaces due to the history of oppression by the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. 
The elite argument angle seems to have a clear consensus amongst a number of scholars which is 
surprising because most of the research is incredibly polarized. Essentially, there needs to be 
more research done because the political situation is constantly changing within the post-soviet 
bloc.  
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Overall, the literature remains to be divided over what the answer is to why there is such 
unevenness in democratic consolidation across the soviet bloc. The literature can be divided into 
two camps. The first camp attribute the unevenness due to how much influence other geo-
political actors have. But even that first camp is divided. Some of the scholars argue that the 
European’s Union push for democratization with the incentive of joining the trillion-dollar 
economic union has led to some democratic consolidation across the post-soviet bloc. Others 
argue that Russia still maintains are cultural, economic, and historical hegemony over much of 
the region and still has influence over many of the domestic politics. The second camp of 
literature argues that its domestic political actors that cause the unevenness of democratic 
consolidation. Some scholars argue that some states have more active civil society groups which 
makes the consolidation process easier. Yet, the majority of the second camp argues that it’s the 
elites and their influence has essentially either helped or halted democratic consolidation across 
the post-soviet bloc. Using scholarly agreement, the soundest argument seems to be the elites and 
the process of institutionalizing their interests has inherently affected the process of democratic 
consolidation across the post-soviet bloc.  
Analytic Framework 
 In order to answer the question concerning the disparity of democratic consolidation 
across the Post-Soviet Bloc, the first theory that can be used is elite theory. By definition, elite 
theory states that power is concentrated and shared by a small group of people (the elites) and the 
masses do not have power (Lasswell 1950). Elite theory came into existence as many were 
debating about how power was to be shared within the state. It also serves as an alternative 
argument to pluralism, who’s basic assumption is that power is concentrated and controlled by 
the masses. The main points within this theory are that power is concentrated in a small group of 
  Anton 12 
 
leaders, there is consensus over values and goals, the elites all share a common background or 
experience, the primary institutions of power are mostly economic and political, there is a 
downward direction of influence, and often policy reflects elite preferences, and the protection of 
the current values lies in elite commitments (Dye 2016). Elite theory presents itself in all types of 
government, including democracies.  
Elite theory is often applied to explain the behavior of states but it particularly fits in the 
explanation when it comes to the unevenness of democratic consolidation across the Post-Soviet 
bloc. Elite theory can be seen in how the government was formed during the transition and 
whether it was comprised of former elites or citizens. This can be indicated by the proportions of 
newly elected officials during the era of transition compared to the number of previous 
communist officials.  The second basic assumption of elite theory is that there is a commitment 
to the protection of current values of their small group.  This commitment to protection can be 
seen in the action of the formation of policy. This can be indicated by the protection of certain 
industries, the protection of previous officials of the communist party, and the protection of 
policy making. The third basic assumption of elite theory is that all elites have a similar 
background and/or experience. This can be seen in the creation of either new elites or a simple 
change of mask. This can be indicated by whether new elites were created during the time of 
transition or the elites from the previous era had simply changed their mask and continued on 
(Rivera 2000). These variables and indicators can be connected to the power and influence geo-
political actors have on domestic internal actors. 
Elite Theory Variable  Indicators  
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Small Group of Leaders  Formation of Government Number of Newly Elected 
Officials vs. Number of 
Previous Communist 
Officials.  
Protection of Elite Values and 
Preferences  
The Formation of Policy Number of Protected 
Industries, Individuals, and 
power in policy-making.  
Similar Background or 
Experience  
Creation of New Elites or a 
Change of the Mask.  
Number of new elites created 
during transition period vs. 
number of elites whom stayed 
strong during the transition 
period.  
 
While the literature does not adhere to one type of theory, elite theory can actually relate 
to the literature quite well. There is argument that the European Union influenced the creation of 
elites in the newly formed democratic states. This can be indicated by the types of financial aid 
and trade preferment programs and whom benefited from these actions.  There is also this same 
argument for Russia as well as in many states, particularly in the foreign policy of Near Abroad, 
Russian companies remain dominant over the commercialization in these states. These can be 
indicated by the numbers of democratic consolidation reported by Freedom House prior to 
Russian intervention and afterwards and the proportion of Russian owned companies and their 
monopoly within the area. Therefore, elite theory can be applied to this case as it not only 
  Anton 14 
 
successfully analyzes the action of domestic political and economic actors but also to some 
extent geo-political actors as well.  
The second theory that is planned to be used is democratic consolidation theory. 
According to the definition, democratic consolidation theory is the challenge of securing and 
sustaining democracies against the threat of authoritarian regression (Schedler 1998). As the 
theory has been studied throughout the years, it has come to use the main points of popular 
legitimization, the diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of antisystem actors, civilian 
supremacy over the military, the elimination of authoritarian enclaves, party building, the 
decentralization of the state power, the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy, judicial 
reform, the alleviation of poverty, and finally economic stabilization (Schedler 1998). This 




Variable  Indicators  
Popular Legitimization and 
Diffusion of Democratic 
Values  
Civil Liberties Freedom House Ranking and 
Reports of Ballot Stuffing,   
Neutralization of 
Authoritarian Enclaves and 
Anti-system Actors  
Political Party Prevalence  Number of Popular Elections, 
Success of unbiased election 
conduct.  
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Judicial Reform, Civilian 
Supremacy over Military, and 
Party Building 
Human Rights  Presence of Military, Process 
of choosing Judges, and the 
number of civilian led 
political parties 
Alleviation of Poverty Social and Economic Welfare 
Programs 
Number of Welfare Programs 
and Success Rate of said 
Programs 
Economic Stabilization Income Inequality The Corruption Index and the 
rates of Income Inequality 
within the state.  
 
The first critical juncture in democratic consolidation theory is popular legitimization and 
diffusion of democratic values. This can be seen in the variable of Civil Liberties. Indicators 
include the right of popular vote, the lack of ballot stuffing, and human rights being instituted in 
everyday life. The second critical juncture is the neutralization of anti-system actors and 
authoritarian enclaves. This can be seen in the variable of political party prevalence and can be 
indicated by how elections are held and whether popular vote actually chooses the candidate. 
The third critical juncture Judicial reform, civilian supremacy over the military and party 
building. This can be seen in the protection of human rights and can be indicated by the number 
of civilian led political parties, how judges are chosen and whether the military plays a major or 
minor role within the state. The fourth and fifth critical juncture are the alleviation of poverty 
and the economic stabilization. Each can be seen in social and economic welfare programs and 
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the level of income inequality in the states.  This can be indicated by the creation of welfare 
programs and whether income inequality remains to be a problem within the state.  
While the theory does not set out an exact process of what a state should do during the 
process of democratization, it does create critical junctures for a state during that process. This 
applies to the research question in a number of ways as well as relates to the literature. 
Democratic transition theory relates to the literature as it explains both arguments made by 
scholars concerning the research question made. The arguments laid out in the literature 
concerning the power of external and internal actors and how they influence the democratic 
consolidation process within the post-soviet bloc all relate to the critical junctures laid out within 
the democratic transition theory. Despite the fact that it can explain the behavior of geo-political 
actors somewhat, much if the critical junctures stated concern the policies and influence of 
domestic internal actors and often forgets how to incorporate the influence of geo-political 
actors. Essentially, the critical junctures laid out within the theory are all influenced by the power 
of external geopolitical actors and internal domestic actors. Therefore, democratic transition 
theory can be applied to this case as it analyzes the action of domestic actors but also some of the 
behavior of geo-political actors.  
Methodology 
 After reviewing the literature and analytic framework, the method to be used to explain 
the disparity of democratization in the Post-Soviet Space will be Alexander George’s Structured 
and Focused Comparison method. The cases to be used is the Republic of Georgia and Ukraine 
after their respective color revolutions in the early 21st century.  This method, in general, allows 
for intensive study concerning a few number of cases which can yield important details 
concerning future policy, whether it be public or foreign (Kachuyevski 2018). This method, later 
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to be explained provides the best framework concerning democratization of the Post-Soviet 
Space. The Structured and Focused Comparison method has a total of three phases. The first 
phase includes a multitude of steps, in order to create the broad topic of a research design. This 
phase includes creating and examining previous research concerning the research question 
identified, examining independent and dependent variables identified through the analytic 
framework, selecting case studies that can answer the research question, operationalizing and 
measuring variables identified, and formulating a list of questions to be asked of each case 
(Kachuyevski 2018).  The second phase and third phases of this method include asking the 
questions laid out in the first phase and comparing the results of each case in order to answer the 
original research question.  
Phase One: 
In George’s Method, the first phase includes the creation of a research question and the 
previous literature written and the gaps to be investigated. The question to be answered is why is 
there such large gaps of democratization across the Post-Soviet Space? The literature review, as 
stated previously, argues that external geo-political actors as well as domestic actors have 
affected democratization within the Post-Soviet Space. Yet, due to the lack of congruence within 
the scholarly community, there is a gap of scholarly work where both geo-political actors and 
domestic actors can work together to create this disparity, which is what to be argued throughout 
this thesis. This argument is going to be tested through the competing theories of elite theory and 
democratic consolidation theory which also leave gaps concerning this issue of disparity.  
 The second step in George’s first phase is looking at variables to be identified and 
measured later in the methodology. The analytic frameworks to be used is elite theory and 
democratic consolidation theory which both seem to explain the actions of domestic actors and 
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some actions of geo-political actors yet there still seems to be a gap. The variables for elite 
theory include the formation of government, policy, and the creation of new elites or a change of 
mask. The second theory to be used in the analytic framework is the democratic consolidation 
theory. This particular theory looks at critical junctures a newly democratizing state must take on 
its journey towards a liberal democratic democracy. The variables for this theory include civil 
liberties, political party prevalence, human rights, social and economic welfare programs, and 
income inequality. 
The Republic of Georgia and Ukraine can be considered great states to compare, 
especially when looking at their historical and contemporary similarities. Both states were 
subject to the rule of Moscow, starting with the Russian Empire and ending with the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. Their color revolutions fell only two years apart and have 
experienced significant steps towards democratization. These steps have inherently moved the 
Republic of Georgia and Ukraine away from the influence Moscow. In addition, both states have 
experienced Russian interference, not only economically and politically, but also through the use 
of military intervention in areas of conflict. These military interventions are often referred to by 
scholars as Frozen Conflicts. Yet, while both states do share similarities, there are some specific 
distinctions that also make them great cases to explain the disparity of democratization across the 
Post-Soviet space. Both states, while having made significant steps towards democratic 
consolidation, their success vary from one another which adds another piece to the puzzle, this 
paper seeks to answer. Overall, The Republic of Georgia and Ukraine, specifically when it 
comes to answering the disparity of democratic consolidation across the Post-Soviet Bloc, fit the 
structured and focused comparison method the best.  
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As the variables listed previously in the analytic framework will be measured using a 
scale either considering small versus large influence from the elite class and high versus low 
success when it comes to the critical junctures described in the democratic consolidation theory. 
For the first theory of elite influence and its level will be measured using the scale in Figure 
Three. All of these variables can be measured using a scale of elite influence. Small elite 
`influence can be measured by the strong civil liberties, a strong presence and respect for human 
rights, and a successful socio-economic status with low levels of corruption. Large elite 
influence can be seen by weak civil liberties, a weak presence and respect for human rights, and 
a low socio-economic status with high levels of corruption. In the chart below, each variable and 
its indicators will be measured using this chart in order to figure out their relationship with elite 
influence.  
Small Elite Influence 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Large Elite Influence  
---------------------------------------------------→ 
• Civil Liberties including: free and fair 
elections, a partially or completely 
free score on Freedom House, 
different political parties, free media, 
lack of a political party monopoly , 
independent judiciary, and power of 
citizens   
Civil Liberties including: lack of free and fair 
elections, a low score on Freedom House, 
lack different political parties, lack of free 
media, presence of ballot stuffing, and a 
dominant political party monopoly, and a 
dependent judiciary, citizens hold no power 
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• Human Rights include: strong 
minority rights, lack of police 
brutality, small presence of military 
force and influence, 
Human Rights: lack of minority rights, 
presence of police brutality and abrupt 
willingness to use force by military,  
• Socio-Economic Welfare: the gap of 
income inequality is small, there is a 
number of socio-economic welfare 
programs which are successful, and 
the lack of corruption.  
Socio-Economic Welfare Includes: the 
income inequality gap is large, there is few 
socio-economic programs that produce 
success, and corruption is rampant . 
 
Questions to be Asked of Each Case 
 The fifth step of the first phase of George’s Framework is creating a list of questions to 
be asked of each case and how it measures according the measures of association listed in the 
fourth step. The questions to be asked include:  
• What are the minority protections laws in The Republic of Georgia and Ukraine? 
• Are the minority protection laws in their respective constitutions? 
• Is there presence of police or military brutality? 
• What are the levels of income inequality in each state? 
• What are the corruption levels in each state? 
• How is each state ranked in Freedom House and other international watchdog 
organizations? 
• Are there free and fair elections?  
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• Are different political parties allowed to run? 
• How have the industries changed since the Color Revolutions of the early 21st century?  
• What industries are protected against Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Startups? 
• Have the officials changed since the color revolutions? 
• Is there presence of Foreign military on national territory? 
Data Analysis  
In order to understand the democratization journey of the Post-Soviet space, a simple 
question was asked concerning what had caused the large disparity of democratization over the 
Post-Soviet Space since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The literature review above 
states that scholars believe it is either domestic actors or external geo-political actors that cause 
the disparity in democratization but no consensus is found amongst scholars. The analytic 
framework above includes elite theory and democratic consolidation theory. The variables listed 
above, sourced from the both theories, were used to create questions to be answered through the 
structured and focused comparison method of Alexander George through the case studies of the 
Republic of Georgia and Ukraine. Overall, what the research shows is that domestic actors play a 
major role in a state’s democratic transition but the analytic framework fails to account for 
foreign military intervention and its effect on democratization. This is to be shown through the 
case studies of The Republic of Georgia and Ukraine.  
The Republic of Georgia  
As stated previously, the Republic of Georgia’s Rose Revolution was one of the most 
successful public protests out of the Color Revolution period of the early 21st century.  The Rose 
Revolution began in 2003 led by public outrage due to immense corruption and poor government 
leadership. These mass public protests brought change as the previous president of the Republic 
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of Georgia, Edvard Shevardnadze resigned from his position and new elections were held. These 
elections were then dominated by Mikael Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) 
Party. After these elections, Saakashvili and the UNM started a period of reform which targeted 
a number of issues within the Georgian government like corruption within government agencies.  
Despite these reforms, the Republic of Georgia is still plagued by a number of issues which 
hinders further democratic consolidation. The greatest issues the Republic of Georgia continues 
to face is biased media, a political party monopoly, and judicial corruption. Therefore, the elite 
presence created during the Rose Revolution can explain the issues the Republic of Georgia still 
faces with democratic consolidation today through the factors of a biased media, a political party 
monopoly, and judicial corruption.  
How is the Government Formed? 
In order to properly understand how the Republic of Georgia’s government is structured, 
three sets of questions were asked including the style or type of government, whether this 
government was comprised of new elites or old elites, and whether the government suffers from 
a large presence of elite influence. Currently, the Republic of Georgia’s style of governance is a 
parliamentary democratic republic operating under a multi-party system. The Republic of 
Georgia has maintained this style of governance since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991. While this style of governance has been maintained, the government did see a major shift 
in power and policy initiatives after the Rose Revolution, as previously mentioned. The first 
group of policy initiatives surrounded the structure of the bureaucracy and how it changed the 
elite landscape of the Georgian government.  
In addition, one of the most significant reforms taken place under Saakashvili’s term as 
president was the restructuring of several government offices. This restructuring created a 
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number of new political elite; changing the demographic and power structure of the Georgian 
government. New elites are those who became politically affluent after the Color Revolutions in 
the early 2000s. For example, a large amount of government officials was fired and new people, 
particularly those of the younger demographic, were hired to take their places (Papava 2009). 
This shift in governmental structure created a vacuum of power as old political elites were either 
voted out or removed from their positions within the government. This new political elite would 
soon rule the government until the 2012 election when the UNM were voted out of office and the 
Georgian Dream became the new dominant party.   
When it comes to looking at new elites and their influence on the political and economic 
level, it would be safe to say that they have maintained a large amount of influence over the 
political system. Large elite influence can be characterized by the amount of power elites have in 
important policy making. For example, Saakashvili created a small circle of political allies and 
much of the reforms were made in a top-down process (Papava 2009). Also, this can also be seen 
in how the political party dominated the parliament and is often criticized to be a notary of the 
executive branch (Papava 2009). All of these issues affect The Republic of Georgia’s democratic 
consolidation because they create a political atmosphere where elites dominate the policy-
making and the political narratives of the state. Therefore, The Republic of Georgia still suffers 
from heavy elite influence as the reforms in the early 21st century bolstered the power of the new 
political elite’s despite their intent of creating a new political structure dominated by democratic 
values.  
What civil liberties and political rights are granted within The Republic of Georgia?  
In order to understand the gravity of elite influence in The Republic of Georgia, one must 
look at what civil liberties and political rights are granted and to what extent are they free of 
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governmental influence. Civil liberties can be defined as the access to freedom of expression and 
belief, association and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual 
rights (Freedom House 2019). Political rights, on the other hand, can be defined as the validity of 
electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and government function (Freedom 
House 2019). With the intention of understanding elite influence and its connection to civil 
liberties and political rights, six indicators including their Freedom House Score, freedom of the 
press, free and fair elections, political party prevalence, and the type of judiciary are to be 
measured. The Republic of Georgia still faces a large issue of elite influence which can be seen 
in the institutionalization of mediocre civil liberties. For example, there are issues of a biased 
media, a political party monopoly under a multi-party system, and a dependent judiciary within 
the Republic of Georgia. The first indicator to be investigated is The Republic of Georgia’s 
Freedom House Score which provides insight to their commitment to the democratic values.  
In addition, this score is broken down into two sub groups which include political rights 
and civil liberties. For political rights, a state is scored out of a total score of 40. For civil rights, 
a state is scored out of a total score of 60. Therefore, a state is measured on a scale with 100 
being the highest possible score. Amongst the post-Soviet states, former Soviet Republics now 
current European Union members have the highest Freedom House scores of the region yet there 
has been significant democratic back-sliding over the past few years. However, outside of the 
European Union, The Republic of Georgia has a higher score compared to post-Soviet states that 
were not inducted into the European Union in the early 2000s.  
Currently, The Republic of Georgia scores a 61 out of 100 possible points dictating that 
they are considered to be partially free on the Freedom Houses’ scale (Freedom House 2019). 
This score is a compilation of a 24 out of 40 for political rights and 37 out of 60 for civil liberties 
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(Freedom House 2020).  While Georgia has made a serious advancement towards 
democratization, it should also be noted that Georgia has witnessed a decline because as of 2019, 
their score was 63 out of 100 (Freedom House 2020). These scores for the Republic of Georgia 
are incredibly important data because it outlines how Georgia fits in with its post-Soviet 
neighbors and it gives a hint as to what they are doing to better democratically consolidate 
compared to their neighbors.  
The second indicator to be measured is Freedom of the Press. Free Press, according to the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), is critical to a democracy because the free media acts 
as a watchdog and reports the wrongdoings of the government… (ACLU 2020). In dictatorships 
and authoritarian governments, the press is either heavily monitored or owned by the government 
to ensure that any dissent is not broadcasted, therefore many watchdog organizations often look 
at the media to check on the progress of democracy. In the case of the Republic of Georgia, there 
is currently access to freedom of the press, but there is an issue of a biased media within the 
Republic of Georgia.  
According to the Encyclopedia of Political Communication, a biased media is “refers to 
the media exhibiting an unjustifiable favoritism as they cover the news” (Kaid & Bacha 2019). 
The Republic of Georgia has had a complicated relationship with the media. One of the missteps 
taken by Saakashvili and his small circle of elites was its treatment of certain media sites, 
particularly those who were sided with the opposition. For example, the government had taken 
control over most of the media including closing down or buying independently owned 
broadcasting stations to make them more aligned towards the government (Papava 2009). These 
earlier actions then created an environment that invited policies to pursue a biased media, a 
problem that The Republic of Georgia faces to this day.  
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  Currently, the media within the Republic of Georgia are known to be “pluralistic” yet 
the media has become more partisan over the years and are often extremely favorable to the party 
in power (Freedom House 2020). If a media outlet is not favorable, there is often issues of 
retaliation (Freedom House 2020).  For example, there are numerous cases where if some 
broadcast stations are not favorable to the current political party in power, the government uses 
taxation as a way to ensure that all broadcast stations are favorable to the government (Freedom 
House 2020). This is to be expected due to the large amount of elite influence is within the 
government and the need to remain in power despite the inherent volatility of a democratizing 
state. While freedom of press is an important civil liberty, free and fair elections play an 
important role in democratic consolidation as well.  
The third indicator to be measured is free and fair elections. Free and Fair elections, 
according to the US Mission to the OSCE, are elections that ensures the authority of the 
government derives from the will of the people (OSCE 2012). Features of these types of 
elections include a society where voting is encouraged, space needs to be provided for political 
parties to work and campaign freely, independent free media, civil society, and an impartial 
judiciary (OSCE 2012). Yet, Free and Fair elections are where democratizing states often have 
the most trouble with due to either their authoritarian or totalitarian pasts. Although, for much of 
the post-Soviet space, particularly the Republic of Georgia, free and fair elections have become 
much easier over time, especially after the color revolution period.  
In the case of the Republic of Georgia, they generally have free and fair elections, 
particularly after the Rose Revolution in the early 2000’s. Yet, there are still a number of issues 
that need to be worked out to this current day. The first issue that prevents the Republic of 
Georgia from furthering in their journey to democratic consolidation is funds being improperly 
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used in elections. For example, there were issues of administrative funds being used to finance 
campaigns (Freedom House 2020). This is an example of how current parties in power used 
public funds in order to re-consolidate their power within the government which highlights the 
issue of high corruption which is still present within the Georgian government today. The second 
issue and possibly the most important is election rules were changed last minute which harmed 
the amount of political parties that could register for the election (Freedom House 2020). The 
sudden change harms the multi-party system as the amount of political parties registered for the 
election were less than what it could have been. This sudden rule change is an example of how 
the political elite, particularly those within the ruling majority, manage to stay in power and keep 
out political rivals. While The Republic of Georgia has achieved the façade of free and fair 
elections, there remains the issue of how high corruption and elite influence prevent them from 
achieving true free and fair elections. Free and Fair elections are often purported by the presence 
of political parties and according to democratic consolidation theory, there must be political 
party prevalence in order to ensure protection against a regression into authoritarianism.  
The fourth indicator to be measured is political party prevalence. Political party 
prevalence is important to democratizing states as they represent a spectrum of political opinion 
from a state’s citizenry. What is meant by political party prevalence is the number of political 
parties present within a state’s political environment. Political parties, while extremely important 
to a democracy’s survival can become an issue if a single party has dominance. The Republic of 
Georgia, despite its massive reform period during Saakashvili’s time as president, there became 
issue concerning political party prevalence within the state. Despite the numerous reforms slated 
during the Rose Revolution, many fell flat and some even created the existence of a political 
party monopoly, which is an issue that the Republic of Georgia still suffers from today. 
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After the Rose Revolution, the United National Movement won in a landslide election, 
soon becoming the dominant party in parliament. Yet, this dominance and influence soon 
became an issue when it came to policy initiatives. For example, the party and its members were 
monopolizing state resources, operating without strong opposition, and due to their power, they 
were able to push through controversial policies (Mierzejewski-Voznyak 2013). These 
monopolistic tactics allowed the UNM to stay in power for almost a decade until a transfer of 
power was made in 2012 to the Georgian Dream Party. Yet, these tactics still have a place in 
government as the Georgian Dream Party still uses these tactics to maintain their monopoly as 
well. For example, in the previous section, The Georgian Dream Party and their allies changed 
the rules of political party registration, ultimately affecting the political landscape of the election 
and ensuring their continued dominance (Freedom House 2020). This has affected further 
democratic consolidation as political elites have managed to maintain their positions and power 
through a political party monopoly.  
The fifth indicator to be measured is judicial independence. According to Popova, 
Judiciary independence can be conceptualized as a lack of bias towards the preferences of 
specific actors (Popova 2012). Judiciary independence is often vital to a democratizing state as it 
bolsters the citizen’s confidence as well as ensures that law enforcement is taken seriously. 
Judiciaries, particularly dependent judiciaries, can be susceptible to corruption and power from 
dominant political parties and dominant domestic actors like political and economic elites. In the 
Republic of Georgia, it seems that there is still issues with creating and maintaining an 
independent judiciary as seen after the Rose Revolution in 2003.  
The Republic of Georgia continues to have issues with the judiciary. Even after 
Saakashvili’s reforms, the judiciary was extremely neglected and is often criticized as an 
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appendage to the General Prosecutor’s office and the Executive Branch (Papava 2009). What is 
meant by this is that the Georgian judiciary is viewed to be dependent on the government’s 
power and influence rather than independent and impartial.  For example, in 2007, over half of 
the population who answered a survey by the Georgian newspaper “The Weekly Palette” said 
that they did not trust the judiciary (Kukhianidze 2009). This comes from the reputation the 
judiciary has due to numerous reports of deaths caused by law enforcement but are never 
investigated nor brought to prosecution. 
Even after the transfer of power in 2012 to the Georgian Dream party, there still remains 
large issues with the judiciary today. There still remains to be a large issue of the legislative and 
executive branches influencing the judiciary which creates a lack of transparency and overall 
independence (Freedom House 2020). But there does seem to be hope as a new bill was passed 
in December of 2019 that created a disciplinary procedure for judges but it should be noted that 
these procedures are still too broad (Freedom House 2020). This issue of judiciary dependence 
all relates back to the fact that new elites were created during the Rose Revolution and how the 
government was reformed rested power within the hands of the elite which has made it difficult 
for civil liberties to be respected because the democratic transition has stopped in terms of 
creating an impartial judiciary.  
Are Human Rights accessible?  
In any democracy, respect for human rights is important. According to the United 
Nations, human rights are “rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, 
nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to 
life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to 
work and education, and many more” (UN 2020). One of the first things to look at when 
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assessing a state’s commitments to democracy and human rights is looking at how the minorities 
are treated and whether they share the same rights as the majority. The first question of human 
rights asked of the Republic Georgia is whether there are minority rights in The Republic of 
Georgia? The short answer is yes but there are some issues, especially issues that often come 
with a state beginning to nationalize.  
In the early 2000’s, The Republic of Georgia instituted a policy of “Civic Nationalism”. 
This policy states that all nationalities had the right to participate in political public life. While 
this policy has a great façade, the actual numbers representing those of national minorities in 
political life are quite low. For example, from 2004 to 2008, only 9 out of 225 MPS were from 
National Minorities (Wheatly 2009). The number continues to decrease as the early 2010’s saw 
only 6 out of 225 MPS were from National Minorities (Wheatly 2009).  For context, the number 
of national minorities politically active within the parliament were higher during the 
Shevardnadze era or pre-Rose Revolution (Wheatly 2009). The lack of minorities active in 
political life hinders democratic consolidation because it can be perceived as the majority is 
taking control over the minority. The policy of “Civic Nationalism” was met with skepticism due 
to its perceived nature of forced assimilation (Wheatly 2009).  This perceived nature of 
assimilation is not too far off as there were controversial language laws that were passed during 
Saakashvili’s time as president. 
In addition, in democratizing and particularly nationalizing states, some states try to 
capitalize and push on the majority culture which often harms the national minorities. In the 
Republic of Georgia, during Saakashvili’s time as president, a series of language laws were 
passed which were met with protest as they were seen as an institutionalization of Georgian 
nationalism which was ignorant of The Republic of Georgia’s national minorities. The first 
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language law was actually passed during the Shevardnadze era but it became mandated in the 
Saakashvili era. This law mandated that all state administration jobs and university jobs required 
a knowledge of Georgian (Wheatly 2009). 
This law was then bolstered by the Bill of General Education, passed in 2005, which 
mandated that all schools must teach Georgian language (Wheatly 2009). Minority political 
involvement was further damaged due to the Civic Nationalism and Language laws because only 
4 % of the ministry of interior affairs are from national minorities and only 6 out of 200 judges 
are from national minorities as well (Wheatly 2009).  Overall, while The Republic of Georgia 
does have legislation protecting national minorities and their rights to political life, their 
livelihoods are severely affected by these language laws, particularly those who live in rural 
areas. These language laws and the “Civic Nationalism” law represent how the elites whom 
belong to the majority are affecting and influencing national policy.  
The second indicator of human rights is looking at police brutality and how it affects the 
livelihood of all citizens. According to Cao, “police brutality is when police offers use excessive 
force towards civilians” (Cao 2003). Police brutality is often an issue in many states including 
democracies. Yet, particularly in the case of the Republic of Georgia, police brutality had been a 
major issue prior to the Rose Revolution. Saakashvili and his allies passed a number of reforms 
were passed including reforms centered on law enforcement.  
Under Saakashvili’s tenure as president, there were a large number of reforms passed and 
taken under by the Georgian government to fix the issues of corruption and lack of efficiency in 
the justice sector. The reforms that were successful include the firing all of the previous law 
enforcement officers from the Shevardnadze era, many who were known to demand bribes. Yet, 
according to Light, the reason for bribes was that the tax collection was so low that officers were 
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not getting paid enough, therefore bribes were often necessary (Light 2014). The second reform 
instituted a merit test which was mandated because for all positions within the government and 
those within law enforcement (Light 2014). And the third reform was that there was a complete 
restructuring of the police academy and all other major police agencies (Light 2014). Despite 
these reforms, there still remains to be issues concerning police brutality within the justice sector.  
As stated previously, the Republic of Georgia still suffers from issues of police brutality 
despite the successful reforms instituted after the Rose Revolution. For instance, there still 
remains the issue of abuse and unlawful treatment against inmates in their prisons. Over 100 
cases were reported to the prosecutors’ office but no investigation was opened (HRW 2019). 
Secondly, there are often complaints about police force and their heavy handedness in drug raids 
and other types of police action (HRW 2019). Thirdly, there remains the issue of law 
enforcement bias when it comes to prosecution. There are a number of cases were either suspects 
are let off or are partially acquitted (HRW 2019). Despite these current issues, there have been 
some recent moves for reform. For example, in July of 2019, a law passed by the parliament that 
created the State Inspector Office which oversees and prosecute cases of abuse by public law 
officials (HRW 2019). There was also another office created under the Ministry of the Interior 
which offers the protection of human rights (HRW 2019).   
In conclusion, Georgia’s internal elites seem to have control over their parliament which 
creates issues of minority rights and police brutality. While reforms have been made because the 
elites were pressured by public opinion, the elites have remained in control as seen in law 
enforcement bias in cases of police brutality. The elites grip on these key sectors of the 
government prevents the Republic of Georgia from moving forward in the process of 
democratization. The fourth variable to be investigated is looking at socio-economic status and 
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how elites capitalize on a state’s income to either move forward or push back against the journey 
towards democracy.  
What is the Socio-Economic Status of these states?  
As post-Soviet states gained their independence in 1991, economically speaking, it was 
difficult for them to get on their feet due to the reliance on the Soviet economy for over 60 years. 
In order to properly assess a state’s socio-economic factors, research was conducted concerning 
the levels of corruption and poverty within the Republic of Georgia. According to Transparency 
International, the definition of corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It can 
be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector 
where it occurs” (Transparency International 2020). These two indicators of corruption and 
poverty are key to fully understand the level of elite influence within the state and how it affects 
their levels of democratization.  
The Republic of Georgia, according to Transparency International, is ranked 44 out of 
180 countries and its current corruption score is 56 out of 100 (Transparency 2019). Essentially, 
The Republic of Georgia’s score is one of the highest out of the Post-Soviet Space. They were 
able to move out of deep corruption that persisted throughout the Soviet era and into post-
independence due to the strong reforms mandated under Saakashvili’s presidency.  Saakashvili is 
most known for his anti-corruption forms in the Republic of Georgia. These corruption reforms 
were grouped into two different factors which included Economic and Education reform which 
was all centered around lessening corruption in these areas of the state (Light 2014).  
The second area of reform was centered on economic reform. The areas of reform include 
reforms to tax collection and revenue. These reforms were so successful that there was a 700% 
increase in tax revenue in 5 years (Mitchell 2009). Also, difficulties were made for businesses 
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and officials when they tried to bribe their way out of taxes (Mitchell 2009). This area of tax 
revenue clean-up was so successful that it had helped the policing reform and corruption because 
the police officers’ salaries were raised (Light 2014). The third area of reform centered on 
education reform and corruption. Saakashvili and the ambassador to the United Nations 
Alexander Lomaia created a set of anti-corruption reforms where many of the private 
universities, certified prior to the Rose Revolution, were decertified and the national education 
administration tests were mandated across the country. These, though met with some resistance, 
were overall successful and bolstered the education system significantly (Mitchell 2009).  
While these reforms were highly successful, they only targeted petty corruption 
throughout the state. Therefore, there still remains issues concerning high level corruption to this 
current day. Saakashvili’s reforms created a small circle of allies whom concentrated and took a 
great amount of power from the legislative and judiciary branches (Transparency International 
2009). These particular reform affected and weakened the opposition parties which left a large 
levels of corruption concerning the powers of the president compared to the legislative and 
judiciary branches. Currently, the ruling party the Georgian Dream and its senior level officials 
have informal agreements with the judiciary branch in order to obtain for favorable decisions 
(Transparency International 2009). These favorable decisions then give judges the chance for 
lifetime appointments (Transparency International 2009).  What this means for The Republic of 
Georgia is that the political arena is still centered around elite power which weakens the 
institutions of democracy within the state.  
The second area of looking at socio-economic status within in a state is poverty. 
According to the United Nations, overall poverty is defined as a lack of income and productive 
resources to ensure sustainable livelihoods…" (UN 1995). Poverty is also one of the indicators of 
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the democratic transition theory and alleviation of it marks represents one part of a liberal 
democracy. Poverty remains to be a large issue across the world but particularly in the Post-
Soviet area where many struggled to become economically stable due to the quick end to the 
once great power. The Republic of Georgia in particular suffers from great poverty and this is 
partly due to the amount of corruption that went on for years but currently the number of poverty 
is still quite staggering to this day.  
Poverty remains to be a large issue in the Republic of Georgia. Currently, 32 percent of 
the population lives below the poverty line in the Republic of Georgia (World Bank 2016). To 
put that into real numbers, out of its population of a little over 3 million people, over 900,000 
people live in poverty. In order to combat poverty, the World Bank and other international 
organizations have instituted economic and education programs (World Bank 2016). The amount 
of poverty actually relates back to corruption in a significant way. There is a correlation between 
the ability to effectively tax and the amount of poverty and income inequality (Gerry 2008). 
Poverty isn’t just an issue of lack of wealth and material but poverty also excludes those whom 
live below the poverty line to be active in social, political, and cultural life (UN 1995). 
Therefore, the domestic elites, despite the reforms the Rose Revolution brought, have taken over 
control and have driven The Republic of Georgia in a direction where politically they might be 
consolidated but socially and economically, the regular citizens are still suffering even with the 
interference of international organizations and civil society groups.  
Conclusion  
 After viewing the data, it seems to be clear that the elites created in the Rose Revolution 
have a large amount of control over the state’s democratic consolidation. While the reform 
period had some successful reforms, many other areas of democratic governance suffered. This 
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can be seen in the areas of a biased media, a political party monopoly, and a dependent judiciary. 
Overall, The Republic of Georgia is a perfect example of how elites can control the pace of 
democratization within the state. Yet, the Republic of Georgia only serves a piece of the puzzle 
when understanding democratization in the Post-Soviet Space. Ukraine, the second case study, 
also serves as an important puzzle piece because like The Republic of Georgia, they have also 
persevered towards democratic consolidation.  
Ukraine: 
 As the Color Revolutions swept through the Post-Soviet region, Ukraine became its next 
target. In 2004, a presidential election was to be held but it soon became contentious between the 
two front runners Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yuschenko as fraudulent election results were 
announced. Mass public protests soon erupted, now known as the Orange Revolution, and some 
success came as new elections were held and a new winner was announced. Yet, as history 
would tell, nothing changed and almost a decade later, protests began again due to the sudden 
decision to not sign the EU Association Agreement. These protests, known as Euromaidan, 
evolved as violence and conflict began between the protesters and law enforcement. Now, almost 
six years later, Ukraine is still plagued by numerous issues which prevent them from moving 
towards total democratic consolidation. The biggest issue is that the elite whom have remained in 
power since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have hindered further democratization. This elite 
presence can be seen by the persistent issues of a dependent judiciary, minority language rights, 
and immense corruption.  
How is the Government Formed? 
Ukraine’s governmental system is a unitary republic which operates under a semi-
presidential system. Ukraine has maintained this style of governance since the dissolution of the 
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Soviet Union but the power shared between the parties of government has changed, particularly 
after the Orange Revolution. For example, after the Orange revolution, the powers of the 
president were diminished and the powers of the parliament were expanded. Yet, as the powers 
of the parliament were expanded, this inherently expanded the powers of the parliamentary elite, 
many who have been in power since independence. While the style of governance is important, 
one must also look at those who make up these governmental structures as well.  
Unlike The Republic of Georgia, much of the Ukrainian elite class is made up of those 
whom are considered to be old elites. Old elites are those whom have been around since the post-
independence era. The communist party elites are not included in what is means to be considered 
an old elite due to the fact that communist party is banned from participating in elections. In 
addition, the elites who came into power belonged to Kuchma’s small circle of allies whom 
benefited from Kuchma’s power in parliament once he became president. These elites would 
soon affect democratic consolidation due to their immense influence within the parliament.  
Elites, in Ukraine, have a great influence on policy and political narratives due to their 
positions in parliament. As stated previously, within the Ukrainian parliament, there were old 
elites dating back from the post-independence era. A criticism of the Orange Revolution by 
scholar’s state that while the Orange Revolution was successful in a number of ways, one of the 
problems of the aftermath was its failure to deal with the elites that still corrupted the parliament 
from Kuchma’s era (Kubicek 2009). Their power and influence was also increased due to the 
shift in the power-sharing agreement between the executive and legislative branches after the 
Orange Revolution in 2004. Therefore, the old elites still maintain a large amount of influence 
over the parliament which inherently affects democratic consolidation within the state.  
What civil liberties are granted within Ukraine?  
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 The first indicator to be measured is Ukraine’s Freedom House World Report Score. 
Currently, Ukraine scores 62 out of a possible 100 points, ranking them at partially free 
(Freedom House 2020). Their score is broken down into 27 points out of 40 for political rights 
and 35 points out of 60 for civil liberties (Freedom House 2020).  What is meant by partially free 
is that some political and civil liberties have been instituted within the system but there are a 
number of other issues which prevent their score from increasing. Yet, Ukraine has recently seen 
an uptake in their score, particularly in the last year or so. This uptake highlights Ukraine’s 
recent commitment post-Euromaidan to furthering democratic consolidation. While Freedom 
House’s scores are an important indicator, they are not the only one when looking at civil 
liberties. The second indicator, freedom of the press, allows for a closer look at how domestic 
actors influence the media.  
The second factor to be measured is Freedom of Press. Ukraine enjoys the right to 
freedom of the press as it is institutionalized and protected in their constitution. For example, 
they have pluralistic media environment and the ability to openly criticize the government and its 
actions (Freedom House 2020). And free media has gotten stronger particularly after Orange 
Revolution in 2004. However, there are still a number of issues that Ukraine’s free press still 
faces on its way towards democratic consolidation. The first issue is that journalists, especially 
those highly critical of the government, are still targeted and there is a lack of protection from 
not only law enforcement but the judiciary as well (Freedom House 2020). The second issue is 
that the elites often influence the media in order to ensure their choice for election is viewed in a 
favorable light. For example, in the most recent election of President Zelensky, a famous 
economic powerhouse influenced popular broadcasting stations in order for Zelensky to have 
more positive coverage compared to his opponent. This is a direct example of how elites can 
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influence elections through the power of media which inherently affects the process of 
democratization. While freedom of the press is an important civil liberty, it is not the only 
variable important to understanding the democratization process of Ukraine.  
The third indicator to be measured is the presence of free and fair elections. Ukraine has 
had a troubled past with free and fair elections. As stated previously, the Orange Revolution was 
kick started due to numerous reports of ballot stuffing which ended with fraudulent election 
results. Yet, Ukraine has mostly cleaned up and tightened regulations around election season but 
there still remains to be some issues concerning free and fair elections. These issues include that 
in the most recent election, polls did not take place in certain parts of the country including 
Crimea and separatist regions of Donbas. This is due to the fact that there are Russian Forces 
currently present in these parts of the country, but that is to be explained later. Also, the OSCE 
had found evidence of vote buying, exploiting legal loopholes, and the misuse of incumbency 
during election season (Freedom House 2020). This highlights the immense corruption that 
Ukraine still faces. And thirdly, there was an issue of new electoral laws being enacted too close 
to an election season (Freedom House 2020). These electoral laws created some confusion which 
threatened the integrity of said elections. This comes to show how domestic actors, particularly 
elites, use elections and its loopholes to maintain their positions within Ukraine.  
The fourth factor to be measured is political party prevalence. Ukraine, unlike the 
Republic of Georgia, does not have an issue of a political party monopoly. There is an abundance 
of political parties and they form and dissolve quite easily (Freedom House 2020). The only 
restriction that international watch dog organizations note is that the communist party is not 
allowed to participate in any elections which one can say undermines Ukraine’s multi-party 
system (Freedom House 2020). But, Ukraine overall seems to have an easier time when it comes 
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to maintaining a large abundance of political parties rather than having one party dominate the 
political structure. This is an example of how elites control the pace of democratization within a 
state. For example, Ukraine’s elites seemed to have allowed democracy to progress in terms of 
political party prevalence while simultaneously preventing other areas of democratization like 
the areas of a dependent judiciary, minority language laws, and immense corruption within the 
state.  
The fifth indicator when measuring a state’s commitment to civil liberties, is looking at 
the judiciary and whether or not it is dependent on governmental power. After the Orange 
Revolution in 2004, the judiciary played a major role in the recount and verification of the false 
win of Viktor Yanukovych but during the period from 2010-2013, the judiciary and its 
independence suffered quite a bit. During this time period, the judiciary could be seen as 
dependent on corruption within the government rather than an impartial and independent branch. 
This was due to a number of reasons. The first issue is that many governmental branches 
operated under self-governance guidelines, mitigating the need for the judiciary to provide 
oversight. The second issue is that those in power would often dismiss and re-assign judges in 
order to ensure loyalty.  These are ways the elite managed to maintain their positions which 
happened at the expense of the judiciary.  But, after Euromaidan, a number of reforms were put 
in place once the protests ended and new government was elected. 
These reforms included a merit exam for all acting judges (VOX 2019). Also, all acting 
judges must have submitted academic, professional, and family records to the government in 
order to mitigate nepotism within the judiciary (VOX 2019). Another reform was spearheaded by 
civil society as they were allowed to participate in the selection of new judges through the Public 
Integrity Council (PIC) (VOX 2019). And the fourth reform included terms that must be met for 
  Anton 41 
 
dismissal in order to prevent the previous cycle of dismissal and re-assignment of judges. These 
reforms were mostly driven by the new government installed after Euromaidan, which one could 
argue was a new elite. Yet, some may believe that the old elite was still present as there were a 
number of issues during the period of judicial reform. For example, many believed that the re-
assessment of judges was too negligent due to a mere 24 hours for review (VOX 2019). Also, 
there was disregard of the judges picked through the PIC (VOX 2019). Overall, it seems the 
judiciary dependence still remains to be an issue for Ukraine despite the Euromaidan reforms. 
One can see that domestic actors, particularly elites, have a large role within the judiciary which 
explains the issue of judicial dependence. But, it is not the only issue as minority language laws 
remains to be an issue as well.  
Are Human Rights accessible? 
As stated previously in the case study concerning the Republic of Georgia, minority 
rights and police brutality are two important markers when measuring a state’s commitment to 
human rights. While Ukraine has an official commitment to human rights, there is a major issue 
concerning minority language laws within the state. Ukraine has had a complicated past since 
post-Orange Revolution and its push for nationalization of Ukrainian culture and language 
despite having half the population speak Russian as their native language. While minority 
language laws have become politicized in the past few years, they play a major part in the 
accessibility of human rights within the state of Ukraine.  
Ukraine has had minority rights since independence in the early 1990’s. In 1990, the 
Declaration for Ukrainian State Sovereignty guaranteed all nationalities the right to national-
cultural development. In 1991, the Law of Citizenship gave citizenship to everyone on territory 
regardless of nationality, if they had been permanent residents. Also, in 1991, the Declaration for 
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Rights of Nationalities created a broad range of rights for minorities (MRGI 2019). And in 1992, 
the Law of National Minorities states that there is state support for the development of minorities 
(MRGI 2019). This law was a supplement to the 1991 bill on the Declaration for Rights of 
Nationalities. While these laws give a great façade, there were some issues concerning these 
laws. For example, the 1991 and 1992 Declaration for Rights of Nationalities did not improve 
the quality of life for national minorities (MRGI 2019). The quality of life for minorities only got 
more complicated as minority language laws became more politicized in the political arena, 
particularly after the Orange Revolution in 2004.  
After the Orange Revolution, there was a push by the Ukrainian government to begin the 
process of creating a Ukrainian national identity separate from the Russian language. This has 
become a moment a contentious juncture for many within Ukraine. In 2012, minority language 
laws were introduced under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych. These laws stated that if there 
was a substantial minority in the area, they were allowed to use their native language in official 
business and education. It should be noted that this law was mostly centered around the use of 
Russian language but it applied to other minority languages as well. For instance, the language of 
the Crimean Tartars is considered to be highly endangered by UNESCO (UNESCO 2019).  This 
language law did not last for long as Euromaidan began in late 2013 and early 2014. In 2014, 
these laws were annulled by the parliament and later in 2018, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court 
called the 2012 Minority Language Laws “Unconstitutional”. As one can see, the state elites are 
unified behind this idea of a singular national identity without the use of the Russian language. 
But, these minority language laws also highlight how the elite manage to control the policy 
narrative as well.  
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The second area of human rights that is to be investigated concerning the accessibility of 
human rights in Ukraine is police brutality. As stated previously, “police brutality is when police 
officers use excessive force towards civilians” (Cao 2003). In Ukraine, there has been a history 
of police brutality. For example, the militia and the police had a bad reputation and were often 
reported to be participating in abuse of power, illegal detention, denial of judicial aid, torture, 
and the killing of those detained (Amnesty 2005). Prior to Euromaidan, the Ukrainian 
Constitution and its articles concerning the law of the militia, it was often interpreted and 
perceived by the government that the militia and police were seen as a protector of the state 
rather than a protector of the public (Frisendorf 2017). Not only was there violence and police 
brutality, but many of the police officers earned their positions through nepotism rather than 
merit (Taylor 2011). Because of this, it is safe to say that the officers were then compromised 
because they were held to political obligations.  
 This issue worsened due to the stick system that had been in place for many years prior. 
The stick system was a system where the more cases solved, the better chance for advancement, 
so more serious cases were often never solved or had been put on the back burner (Frisendorf 
2017). Officers were also compromised due to the fact that salaries were low so corruption and 
bribes were often necessary to live. The elites of the post-Orange Revolution and leading up to 
Euromaidan maintained their positions through the actions of police brutality. They did so 
through the perpetuation of the stick system and through the acts of nepotism. Yet, during 
Euromaidan, the police and government created an even worse reputation for themselves after 
the police hired thugs, who were deployed to break up the opposition rally (Euromaidan) which 
ended with numerous people injured and others dead. Euromaidan is often referred to as a 
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turning point because there was a massive change to law enforcement due to the violence during 
the protest.  
 After Euromaidan, a number of reforms were made to the police due to the horror and 
violence that was seen during the protests. The first reform was dissolving the Berkut Unit in 
2014 due to their participation in the Euromaidan protests. The second reform founded a new 
patrol police force. This force was based off of recruitment and creation were based off the Rose 
Revolution’s plan for corrupt officers. But instead of a mass firing, all officers were slowly 
dismissed through a two-year period. There were also new screening and teaching methods 
instituted which emphasized the state’s commitment to human rights, outlined when use of force 
was acceptable, and pushed for transparency. For the patrol police, they attracted applicants 
through merit than relying on the previous system of nepotism and political favors. And in order 
to prevent bribes and corruption through political favors, salaries were raised for the officers and 
new vehicles were also given. There was also a new law passed in 2015 which dissolved the 
national militia and created the National Ukrainian Police Force. Also, this force included those 
who were previously with the militia but only after a screening had taken place and whether any 
crimes had been committed. While these reforms were quite successful, police brutality still 
plagues the Ukrainian law enforcement system.  
 The first issue is the apparent lack of accountability. There has been indifference and lack 
of investigation when it comes to past abuses, particularly those during Euromaidan. This lack of 
accountability is worsened by the fact that the law enforcement within Ukraine failed to preserve 
evidence from Euromaidan which has made it difficult to proceed with prosecution (HRW 2019). 
There was also the acquittal of 19 anti-Maidan protesters which appeals had begun but it remains 
to be at a standstill which gives a foreshadowing of what the current judicial system acts like 
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(HRW 2019). There are also issues with arbitrary detention. In 2014, 18 people were held in a 
secret detention center in Kharkov for over two years before being freed in 2016. This detention 
was never acknowledged by the government until 2019 (HRW 2019).  In 2019, a criminal 
investigation was ordered but the investigations of stalled (HRW 2019). Overall, despite the 
reforms made in 2014, the elites still have the law enforcement under their influence and are able 
to control the quality of the investigations which greatly impacts a state’s democratic 
consolidation.  
What is the Socio-Economic Status of these states? 
The last question to be answered by the case study of Ukraine concerns the socio-
economic status of the state. The two factors to be analyzed are corruption and poverty. The 
current definition of corruption to be used to explain Ukraine’s process comes from 
Transparency International which states “corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain. It can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost 
and the sector where it occurs” (Transparency International 2020). Ukraine currently struggles 
with immense corruption and has maintained its status as a hot-topic since pre-Orange 
Revolution. Despite the numerous reforms, the status has remained the same. Therefore, 
corruption is caused by the current elites in power and those who have managed to stay in power 
since post-independence in the early 1990’s. 
According to Transparency International, Ukraine is ranked at 126th out of 180 countries 
that are scaled according to their corruption index (Transparency International 2020). Ukraine’s 
actual score is 30 out of a possible 100 points (Transparency International 2020). Ukraine, as 
stated previously has struggled with corruption since post-Independence. During Yuschenkos’ 
presidency, there was a number of reforms put through but were met with no success. These 
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reforms including power dispersion due to the coalition government between Tymoshenko’s 
party “Fatherland” and Yuschenkos’ party “Our Ukraine”. But, these reforms actually gave the 
opposition more power as they were more united. In Ukraine’s case, they defied scholar’s 
expectations because power dispersion is often the best way to combat political corruption 
(Hellman 1998; Frye & Mansfield 2003; Andrews & Montinola 2004; Gehlbach & Malesky 
2010).  In addition, Yuschenko had implemented reforms like Saakashvili in order to combat 
police, education, judicial, and political corruption but these reforms fell flat with corruption 
maintaining its position as one of the biggest issues in Ukraine. The failure in reforms were due 
to a number of issues. The first major issue was that there seemed to have been a lack of a 
coherent plan. Secondly, Yuschenkos’ government was made up of a coalition government 
between two parties which seemed to have suffered from internal fighting. Because of these 
reasons, elites whom had been in power since post-independence were able to use these issues 
against Yuschenkos’ government and maintain the action of corruption despite the reforms put in 
place. 
As corruption persisted, Euromaidan happened and it seems to become a turning point in 
combating corruption in Ukraine. There have been improvements in corruption, transparency, 
and openness after the Maidan Protests in late 2013 and early 2014. The reforms implemented 
after Euromaidan were meant to target issues like accountability in public money and police 
brutality. These reforms are considered to be successful because in 2017, Ukraine ranked higher 
compared to other European Union states like Italy and Bulgaria in the public sector in the areas 
of transparency and openness (USIP 2019). The reforms after Maidan have brought some change 
to the system but corruption still manages to have Ukraine in its hold with a number of issues 
(USIP 2019). Firstly, the incumbent elites have little incentive to change the political and 
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economic issues that come with corruption. This can be seen in areas such as tax collection and 
administration (USIP 2019).  Secondly, civil society, though a dominant domestic actor after 
Euromaidan, has been focused on other issues rather than economic corruption. This can be seen 
in that despite of financial aid packages from international Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and other external actors, civil society does not pick up on corruption in this area (USIP 
2019). Overall, corruption maintains to be a large issue in Ukraine despite numerous reforms. 
This can be caused by elites and their tight grip and large influence over the government in 
Ukraine.  
The second area that measures socio-economic measures is looking at poverty. Poverty, 
according to the United Nations, “is defined as a lack of income and productive resources to 
ensure sustainable livelihoods…" (UN 1995). Currently, Ukraine does suffer from moderate 
poverty but it has always been one of the better off states due to their resources and economic 
capabilities, dating back to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. In 2016, Ukraine’s poverty 
rate measured around to be 6.4 percent of the population was declared to be under the poverty 
line. Out of the 42 million people that live in Ukraine, it comes out to 2 million people live in 
poverty. Ukraine does receive financial aid from international organizations and external actors 
to help combat poverty but on the scale compared to other Post-Soviet states, their aid is 
definitely less. Poverty can also be caused by the fact that tax collection is quite low in Ukraine 
due to the immense corruption rampant. Poverty is just another way that elites manage to stay in 
power due to the little incentive to change the current system.  
Conclusion 
 Ukraine, like its counterpart The Republic of Georgia, still has a long way to go in order 
to fully democratically consolidate. Ukraine is still under the influence of elites whom have 
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benefited from the corrupt system since post-independence. This can be seen in the areas of a 
dependent judiciary, the institution of minority language laws, and the rampant corruption within 
the state. While Ukraine has come quite a long way since the Orange Revolution of 2004, there 
is still much to be expected of the state since Euromaidan was only a few years ago. Overall, 
Ukraine, like the Republic of Georgia, serves as a perfect example of how domestic actors, 
particularly elites, can control the pace of a state’s journey towards democracy.  
Theoretical Implications  
 While elite theory and democratic transition theory do a great job at analyzing the 
variables and indicators listed above, it fails to account for the actions of external actors like the 
Russian Federation and how they use military intervention to prevent democratic consolidation 
within the Republic of Georgia and Ukraine. What is meant by military intervention is “the threat 
or use of force across state borders…without the permission of the state within those territory 
force is applied” (Holzgrefe 2009). Another striking similarity between The Republic of Georgia 
and Ukraine is that both states have a history of foreign military intervention, particularly after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Color Revolutions of the early 2000’s. Therefore, 
elite theory and democratic transition theory fail to account for the foreign military interventions 
which have prevented democratization within the Republic of Georgia and Ukraine.  
The Republic of Georgia has a history of foreign military intervention stemming from 
post-independence. Both of these foreign military interventions have the same actors partaking 
which include the Republic of Georgia and The Russian Federation. The first military 
intervention began in the early 1990’s when the separatist region of Abkhazia had voted in a 
referendum to separate from the Republic of Georgia which sparked issues. This referendum was 
sparked because Abkhazia’s government were and are currently threatened by the push for 
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Georgian Nationalism starting under Shevardnadze’s government and continued under new 
policies in Saakashvili’s government (Garb 2009). This conflict soon turned violent between The 
Republic of Georgia and Abkhazia. The Abkhazians believe that the Georgians acted with 
genocidal intent because the conflict was ridden with violence and destruction of cultural and 
historical treasures of Abkhazia’s history (Garb 2009). How the Russian Federation comes into 
the picture all comes down to Day Zero and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
 What drove the Russian Federation to officially enter the conflict came down to the 
citizenship law decided on Day Zero which gave citizens of the previous Soviet Union the choice 
to either take citizenship of the territory they are residing in or take Russian citizenship.  In 
Abkhazia, 80 to 90 percent of the population holds a Russian passport (Allin 2008). Due to the 
violence, The Russian Federation came in and to this day act as peacekeeper which prevents any 
further conflict but also extends Russian influence within the area. Yet, it should be stated that 
the people of Abkhazia want independence as their own state, not a part of the Russian 
Federation nor The Republic of Georgia. For instance, this can be seen in the 2004 election 
where the pro-Russian candidate, backed by Moscow, was not elected despite the clear 
interference on the Russian Federation’s part. However, the Russian Federation still manages to 
influence the region and use its leverage, particularly now as Putin pushes his “Russian World” 
policy which protects citizens and compatriots, which much of Abkhazia are both. The Republic 
of Georgia and the Russian Federation are also involved with a second frozen conflict but this 
conflict surrounds the region of South Ossetia.  
The conflict with South Ossetia began during the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
beginning of Georgian Independence. Violence broke out in the 1990’s after the dissolution of 
Soviet Union and the push for Georgian nationalism aka the slogan “Georgia for Georgians”. 
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Many in South Ossetia, like the population in Abkhazia were afraid and threatened by the push 
for Georgian Nationalism. The majority of those living in South Ossetia took the option after 
Day Zero and hold Russian citizenship and hold residency within Georgia but do not claim 
Georgian citizenship (Allin 2008). This violence in the early era ended with a peace agreement 
that allowed for Peacekeeping forces which included all three parties of Russia, Georgia, and 
South Ossetia. Yet, tension began once again in 2004 under Saakashvili’s tenure as presidency.  
Tensions had been building since 2004 since Saakashvili had won presidency after the 
successful Rose Revolution. One of Saakashvili’s main points included maintaining Georgia’s 
territorial integrity which included South Ossetia.  In 2008, Saakashvili went to “restore” 
Georgian control over South Ossetia which sparked violence not only from within South Ossetia 
but also with Russia. This military action created an issue with the Russian Federation and they 
not only recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states but also intervened 
militarily on part of South Ossetia.  The Russian federation also maintains control and due to 
having two separatist regions with occasional conflict between the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Georgia, democratization has been put on hold in some of these regions. Elite theory 
and democratic transition theory also fails to account for the behavior of conflict between the 
Russian Federation and The Republic of Georgia which creates issues when trying to explain the 
democratic consolidation process of the Republic of Georgia.  
Ukraine has also suffered from foreign military intervention though it began quite later 
compared to the Republic of Georgia. As stated previously, Euromaidan created numerous 
reforms but it also led to a situation where The Russian Federation annexed Crimea, although 
initially denied. Crimea has a history with the Russian Federation beginning during the reign of 
Catherine the Great in the Russian Empire and ending with the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
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when Ukraine took ownership over the peninsula. The Russian Federation was allowed to lease 
their naval base but that had created discontent amongst the military elite in Moscow. Also, 
Crimea has a large ethnic Russian population dating back to the Soviet Union along with the 
Crimean Tartars whom returned after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. To this day, The 
Russian Federation still has control over the peninsula which affects the democratization process 
in Ukraine particularly when it comes to free and fair elections. Essentially, elite theory and 
democratic transition theory could have not accounted neither for Putin’s’ actions nor the effect 
on democratization this action would take.  
Along with the annexation of Ukraine, there has been conflict in the Eastern part of the 
country particularly in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk which are collectively referred under 
the name of Donbass. This violence is between Ukrainian forces and Russian backed separatists 
(Russia has denied involvement with these separatists but NATO and Ukraine have reported a 
build- up of Russian military personnel and equipment along with Russian shelling at the border) 
(CFR 2019). While there is technically no Russian military involved in these regions, there is 
presence of Russian interference. In addition, many scholars and government leaders believe that 
the separatists are not acting on their own accord but are rather under the influence of Moscow. 
This can be seen with the Russian support for Ukraine to allow these regions to have a special 
status which can give them veto power on federal initiatives. This could heavily affect the 
democratization process and elite theory and democratic transition theory fail to account for this 
push for presence within Ukraine’s process towards democratization.   
Conclusion 
 Overall, while elite theory and democratic transition theory do a fantastic job at 
explaining the democratic consolidation process through the variables and indicators measured 
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above, it fails to account for foreign military interference and how that affects a state’s 
democratic consolidation process. From what the research shows, is that the Republic of Georgia 
has democratized quite well since the Rose Revolution but continues to fail in the areas 
concerning free and fair elections, free media, and judicial corruption. Yet there is hope as it 
seems that the government is taking steps to combat these issues but due to the newly instituted 
law, it is too soon to say therefore more research is needed in the future. In the case of Ukraine, 
the Orange Revolution needed to happen but Ukraine mostly began their journey after 
Euromaidan and the success of reforms right after Euromaidan compared to those reforms that 
were instituted post-Orange Revolution. Despite these reforms, there still remains to be issues of 
a dependent judiciary, minority language laws, and immense corruption. Consequently, it is too 
soon to tell with Euromaidan and whether the reforms can be considered a success and have 
furthered to process of democratic consolidation in Ukraine. Therefore, more research needs to 
be conducted on how foreign military intervention affects democratization and how elite theory 
and democratic transition theory can learn to account for the actions of external geo-political 
actors.  
Variables  The Republic of Georgia  Ukraine  
Style of Governance Parliamentary Democratic 
Republic under a multi-party 
system  
Unitary Republic under a 
semi-presidential system 
New vs. Old Elites New Elites Old Elites  
Elite Influence  Large Amount of Elite 
Influence  
Large Amount of Elite 
Influence 
Freedom House Score  61 62 
Free Press Free Press Free Press 
Free and Fair Elections Yes Yes 
Political Party Prevalence No Yes 
Type of Judiciary  Dependent Dependent but getting better 
Minority Rights  Yes but there are issues Yes but there are issues 
Police Brutality  Yes Yes but has gotten better 
since Euromaidan 
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Corruption Yes but not as much petty 
corruption 
Yes 






















  Anton 54 
 
References: 
Allin, L., “Passport power: documents, citizenship and Russian leverage in Abkhazia” Frozen 
conflicts and unrecognized states in Southeast Europe and Eurasia. (2008).  
Bunce, V. “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Post-Communist 
Experience.” World Politics 59, no.2 (2003): 167-192.  
Budz, I. “What prevents the Ukrainian from becoming truly effective and independent?” VOX 
Ukraine. (2019).  
Cao, L. “Curbing Police Brutality: What Works? A Reanalysis of Citizen Complaints at the 
Organizational Level” National Criminal Justice Service. (2003).  
Carnaghan, E. “Thinking about Democracy: Interviews with Russian Citizens”. Slavic Review 
60, no.2 (2001).  
Council on Foreign Relations. “Global Conflict Tracker: Ukraine” (2020).  
Dimitrova, A. & Pidham, G. “International actors and democracy promotion in central and 
eastern Europe: the integration model and its limits” Democratization 11, no.5. 
(2004): 91-112, 
Dimitrova, Antoaneta. “The uncertain road to sustainable democracy: elite coalitions, citizen 
protests and the prospects of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe” East European 
Politics 34, no.3 (July 2018): 257-275.  
Downes, R. “Economic transformation in central and Eastern Europe: The role of regional 
development, European Planning Studies”, 4:2, 217-224 1996.  
Dye, T. R., Schubert, L., Zeigler, H. “The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to 
American Politics.” United States: Cengage Learning, 2013. 
  Anton 55 
 
Embassy of Ukraine in the USA. “On the protection of the national minority rights in Ukraine” 
Embassy of Ukraine. (2014).  
Freedom House. “Freedom in the World Report 2020: Ukraine” (2020).  
Freire, M.R. & Heller, R.  “Russia’s Power Politics in Ukraine and Syria: Status-seeking 
between Identity, Opportunity and Costs”, Europe-Asia Studies (2018). 70:8, 1185-1212. 
Friesendorf, C. “Police Reform in Ukraine as Institutional Bricolage, Problems of Post-
Communism”, 66:2, (2019). 109-121 
Garb, Paula “The view from Abkhazia of South Ossetia ablaze”, Central Asian Survey, 28:2, 
(2011). 235-246 
German, Tracey “Russia and South Ossetia: conferring statehood or creeping annexation”, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16:1, (2016).  155-167, 
Grimm, S. & Weiffen, B.” Domestic elites and external actors in post-conflict democratization: 
mapping interactions and their impact, Conflict, Security & Development”, 
(2018). 18:4, 257-282 
Giuliano, E. “Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of 
the Ukraine crisis”, Post-Soviet Affairs, 34:2-3 (2018), 158-178, 
Hellman, J. “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist 
Transitions.” World Politics 50, no.2 (1998): 203–234. 
Howard, M. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, (2003). New 
York: Cambridge University Press.  
Holzgrefe, J.L. “Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas.” Cambridge 
University Press. NY, USA. (2009).  
Human Rights Watch. “Ukraine: Events of 2018”. (2019). Human Rights Watch.  
  Anton 56 
 
Human Rights Watch. “Georgia: Events of 2018)” (2019). Human Rights Watch.  
Innes, A. “The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe.” JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 52, no.1 (2014): 88–104.  
Kaid, L & Bacha, C. “Media Bias” Encyclopedia of Political Communication (2019).  
Khmelko, I. & Bonnal, M. “Corruption and Legislatures: Exploring Perceptions of Ukrainian 
Legislator” Public Integrity (2019). 
Kubicek, P. Problems of post-post-communism: Ukraine after the Orange 
Revolution, Democratization, 16:2, (2009). 323-343 
Kukhianidze, A. “Corruption and organized crime in Georgia before and after the ‘Rose 
Revolution”, Central Asian Survey, 28:2, (2009) 215-234.  
Light, M.  “Police reforms in the Republic of Georgia: the convergence of domestic and foreign 
policy in an anti-corruption drive”, Policing and Society, 24:3, (2014) 318-345 
Lincoln A. Mitchell “Compromising democracy: state building in Saakashvili's Georgia”, 
Central Asian Survey, 28:2, (2008). 171-183, 
Minority Rights Group International. “Ukraine: World Report” MRGI (2019).  
Mishler, W. and Rose, R. “Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism: Popular Evaluation of Civil and 
Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies”. Journal of Politics 59, no.2 (1997).  
Mierzejewski-Voznyak, M. “Party politics after the colour revolutions: party institutionalization 
and democratization in Ukraine and Georgia”, East European Politics, 30:1, (2014).  
Natorski, M. “Reforms in the judiciary of Ukraine: domestic practices and the EU's policy 
instruments”, East European Politics, 29:3, (2013) 358-375, 
Nasuti, P. “Administrative Cohesion and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Georgia and Ukraine”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 68:5, (2016) 847-867 
  Anton 57 
 
OSCE. “Free and Fair Elections” US Mission to the OSCE. (2012).  
O'Dowd, L. & Dimitrovova, B. (2011). Promoting Civil Society Across the Borders of the EU 
Neighborhood: Debates, Constraints and Opportunities. Geopolitics. 16. 176-192.  
Offe, C. “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in 
East Central Europe.” Social Research 58, no.4 (1991): 865–892. 
Papava, V.  “Georgia's economy: post-revolutionary development and post-war difficulties”, 
Central Asian Survey, 28:2, (2009). 199-213 
Petrova, T. “Citizen Participation in Local Governance in Eastern Europe: Rediscovering a 
Strength of Civil Society in the Post-Socialist World?” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no.5. 
(2011): 757-787 
Popova, M. “Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence from 
Russia and Ukraine”. Comparative Political Studies, 43(10) (2010).: 1202–1229.  
Rivera, S. W. "Elites in Post-Communist Russia: A Changing of the Guard?" Europe-Asia 
Studies 52, no. 3 (2000): 413-32.  
Rose, R.  “How People View Democracy: A Diverging Europe”. Journal of Democracy 12, no.1 
(2001).  
Sharshenova, A. & Crawford, G. “Undermining Western democracy promotion in Central Asia: 
China’s countervailing influences, powers and impact” Central Asian Survey 36, no. 4 
(2017): 453-472, 
Shelest, Hanna “After the Ukrainian crisis: Is there a place for Russia?”, Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, 15:2 (2015), 191-201 
Schedler, A. (1998). What is Democratic Consolidation? Journal of Democracy 9(2), 91-107. 
  Anton 58 
 
Skalamera, M. “Russia’s Lasting Influence in Central Asia.” Survival 59, no. 6 (February 2017): 
123–42.  
Taylor, Brian “State Building in Putin’s Russia” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
(2011).  
Transparency International. “From concentrated power to state capture: Georgia’s backsliding 
anti-corruption reforms” Transparency International. (2019).  
Transparency International. “What is Corruption” Transparency International (2019). 
Transparency International. “Ukraine” (2019). Transparency International   
Treaty on European Union (1993). Copenhagen Criteria, Article 49.  
Tilly, C. “Democracy Is a Lake.” In The Social Construction of Democracy. (1995):365–
366. New York: New York University Press, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Tregrub, O. “Ukrainian activism for transparency and accountability: two steps forward, one step 
back.” USIP 2019.  
United Nations. “Human Rights” United Nations (2020.)  
United Nations. “Ending Poverty” United Nations (2020).  
Volkov, V. Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian 
Capitalism. (2002). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Wheatley, J. “Managing ethnic diversity in Georgia: one step forward, two steps back” Central 
Asian Survey, 28:2, 119-134 (2009) 
World Bank. “People’s Voices in Ukraine: What is Poverty?” World Bank (2018).  
World Bank. “Georgia: Recent Trends and Drivers in Poverty Reduction.” World Bank (2016).  
Ziegler, C. “Great Powers, Civil Society, and Authoritarian Diffusion in Central Asia” Central 
Asian Survey 35, no. 4 (2016): 549-569 
